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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY

A-

Jurisdictional Statement
Appellee Overland hereby adopts by reference the

jurisdictional statement set forth in its original brief.

B.

Case History
This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs Dale

L. Larson, Grethe Larson and Systematic Builders, Inc. in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

(R. 002) Nearly three years after its original filing,

the District Court granted a series of motions for partial
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
940, 1018-1021).

(R. 845-847, 936-

Plaintiff appealed the District Court's

summary judgments, and oral arguments before the Utah Court of
Appeals were held on June 20, 1991, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
Pursuant

to

such

oral

arguments,

the

Court

of

Appeals

requested that supplemental briefs be filed by the parties
regarding the application of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805
P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991) to the case at bar.

1

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
Both

Appellants

and

Appellee

Overland

have

recognized through their oral argument to this Court that a
primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in
determining the lease to be a "true lease" as a matter of law
rather than a security agreement, where there is no dispute as
to lease terms or contents.

Further supplemental arguments

have been requested by this Court particularly regarding the
application of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d 189 (Utah
App.

1991) to the lease characterization

issue.

The LMV

Leasing opinion is set forth in its entirety in Addendum I
herein.
A-

The District Court Correctly Determined
Characterization Issues As a Matter of Law

The

Lease

A trial court may render summary judgment only if
there is no genuine issues as to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

LMV

Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah App. 1991);
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light,
776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
56(c).
Moreover,

the

interpretation

of

an

unambiguous

contract is a question of law which does not require any
particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of
the contract.

LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192

(Utah App. 1991) ; Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire and
2

Casualty

Co. , 790 P.2d

581, 582

(Utah App. 1990).

More

specifically, a determination of whether an agreement is a
lease or a secured sales agreement is a question of law when
the analysis

is based upon the language of the agreement

itself and not upon extrinsic evidence.

LMV Leasing, Inc. v.

Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192-193 (Utah App. 1991); Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the parties have not disputed
the actual terms or contents of the lease, rather they dispute
only the characterization of the document.
District Court correctly

characterized

Consequently, the

the undisputed

and

unambiguous lease as a matter of law rather than preserving
such issue as a question of fact as urged by the Appellants.
B.

The Face of the Lease Presents No Dispositive Evidence
Which Warrants Disregard of Lease Form
In LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 194

(Utah App. 1991), this Court stated:
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the
document itself.
It should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of
its parts should be given affect insofar as that is
possible.
(Citing Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740
P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Pursuant thereto, this

Court should review the face language used by the parties as
evidence of their intent that the agreement was a lease.
generally LMV Leasing, 805 P.2d at 194.

3

See

Review of the lease language herein supports the
conclusion

that

the

constitute a lease.

parties

such

document

to

Specifically, the opening statement of

the Lease provides that
x

intended

ff

PFC,

N

Lessor,!

hereby

leases to

Lessee,f the property described herein below according to the

terms set forth.11

Moreover, Sections I and II set forth the

definitions of the "leased property11 and the "lease term"
respectively.

PFC1 is consistently referred to as Lessor, and

Appellant Dale L. Larson, in his capacity as dba L&L Wire EDM,
is consistently
itemized

denominated

provisions

of the

as

Lessee.

Lease

Furthermore, the

routinely

refer

to

the

payments made under the Lease as rental payments, and all
references to the agreement itself denominate it as a lease.
Finally,

the

Lease

is executed

by

the

parties

in

their

respective capacities as "lessor" and "lessee."
Consequently,
language

reveals

initial

characteristics

inspection
and

of

language

the

Lease

strikingly

similar to the lease scrutinized by the court in LMV Leasing
and determined therein to be a true lease.
c

«

"Behind the Form" Analysis Reveals
Evidence Contrary to Lease Status

No

Dispositive

The LMV Leasing court further determined that

f!

[i]n

determining the nature of an agreement purporting to be a true
lease, courts must [also] look behind the form of an agreement

1

Appellant Overland subsequently took over all interest,
right and title of PFC in and to the lease.
4

to determine whether it is, in fact, a sales agreement with a
reservation

of a security

interest

in the vendor."

LMV

Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 194 (Utah App. 1991);
see e.g. Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 709 (Utah
1981) .

As set forth in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code

(!fUUCCff) and as recognized by the LMV Leasing court, "unless
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of
title thereunder is not a "security interest." Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-1-201(37) (1980) (emphasis added) (amended 1990); LMV
Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d

189, 194-195

(Utah App.

1991) .
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larson Brothers Const.
Co. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court set forth
twelve

relevant

factors

determined

to

be

helpful

in

characterizing an agreement as a true lease or a security
agreement.

A portion of such factors constitute the sole

basis upon which Appellants challenge the District Court's
characterization

of

the

Lease

herein

as

a

true

lease.

However, the LMV Leasing court noted that "in setting forth
this list, the Supreme Court, by its own language did not
purport to assemble an exhaustive list of factors that may be
considered in characterizing a contract as a lease or as a
security agreement."

LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d

189, 195 (Utah App. 1991).

As in the true lease scrutinized

in LMV Leasing, the Lease herein also reveals the presence of

5

several

Colonial

Leasing

factors*

Specifically,

Appellant Lessee was required to provide insurance, pay taxes,
and pay repair and maintenance costs for the leased equipment.
The

lease

further

includes

acceleration and resale.
warranties

regarding

default

provisions

regarding

Moreover, Appellee Overland made no

merchantability,

fitness,

design

or

quality.
However, as in LMV Leasing, despite the presence of
these several factors, other aspects of the lease demonstrate
the

clear

intention

nevertheless
Leasing,

of

the

parties

that

the

lease

intended to be a true lease agreement.

805

P.2d

at

196.

Specifically,

there

was
LMV

is

no

provision, either explicit or implicit, for the transfer of
ownership of the vehicles to Appellant Lessee.

"The prime

essential distinction between a lease and a conditional sale
is that in a lease the lessee never owns the property."
Leasing, 805 P. 2d at 196 (emphasis in original)
omitted).

LMV

(citations

Paragraph 9 of the instant Lease, specifically

provides:
Equipment is, and shall at all times remain, the
property of lessor; and lessee shall have no right,
title or interest therein or thereto except as
expressly set forth in this lease.
(See paragraph 9 of Addendum II) . Such retention of title in
Appellee Overland, as subsequent lessor, is the "paramount
attribute of a lease."

LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d

6

189, 196 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Carlson v. Tandy Computer
Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 1986)).
Moreover,
Appellant

although

the

instant

lease

grants

Lessee an option to purchase, unlike the lease

scrutinized in LMV Leasing, such option by its terms also
supports a lease characterization.

Specifically, such option

fails to fall within the objective standard set forth by the
UUCC that an "option to become the owner of the property for
no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration
does make the lease one intended for security."
Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1980) (amended 1990).
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 801

Utah Code

In FMA Financial

(Utah 1979) the court

declared that a comparison of the "option price to the fair
market value of the property at the time the option is to be
exercised is the most relevant in determining whether the
option price is nominal." Where the option price is one equal
to or greater than fair market value, such price is not to be
considered nominal.
Paragraph 11 of the Lease herein grants Appellant
Lessor an option to purchase as follows:
11.
Lessee shall have an option to purchase
Equipment at the end of the Lease for Fair Market
Value at that time plus all obligations remaining
due under this Lease. Notice of exercise of this
option must be given in writing to Lessor or
Lessor's assignee at least thirty days prior to the
expiration of the Lease.
This option shall
terminate and be void upon termination of this Lease
by reason of Lessee's default.
(Addendum II, Paragraph 11 (emphasis added).
7

Moreover, the actual price for which the equipment
was sold nearly four and one half years after its purchase and
within six months of the actual lease expiration date was
approximately
price,

fourteen percent

(14%) of

(R. 963-964; Deposition

the actual

of Robert John

sales

Lucking,

Exhibit 5 ) .
Consequently, since

(1) the instant Lease on its

face purports to be a lease; (2) there is no express provision
for transfer of ownership, and

(3) the option to purchase

could not be exercised for nominal considercition, there is no
dispositive evidence that the parties intended to create a
security agreement or transfer the functional equivalent of
ownership.
CONCLUSION
Since there is no dispositive indication on the face
of the lease that the parties intended to execute a security
agreement, this Court should defer to the language of the
unambiguous

instrument

characterization.
196

(Utah

App.

as

the

basis

for

its

legal

LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189,
1991) ; accord

Carlson

v.

Tandy

Computer

Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 1986); American Standard
Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th
Cir.

1981).

analysis

of

Pursuant to the express lease language, the
purpose

and

intentions

of

the

parties

as

demonstrated by the lease provisions and the application of
the principles set forth in LMV Leasing, this Court should
8

determine as a matter of law that the Lease herein constitutes
a true lease.
Consequently,

Appellee

Overland

respectfully

requests this Court to deny all aspects of Appellant's appeal
regarding

issues of lease characterization

and

commercial

reasonableness of sale.
Respectfully submitted this^l^ *~ day of June, 1991.
ALLEN^NEiSON HARDY & EVANS

leffrey M. Jones, Esq.
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
Robert L. Payne, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellee
Overland Thrift & Loan
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^

day of June,

1991, I did mail a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE OVERLAND THRIFT & LOAN, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Joseph Bottums, Esq.
BOTTUM, J.H. & ASSOCIATES
136 South Main
Suite #418
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main
Suite #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM I

-10-

LMV LEASING, INC. v. CONLIN

Utah 189

Cite as 805 P.2d 189 (UtahApp. 1991)

ferent Since both parts of the Strickland
test have been met, we hold that Templin
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART,
DURHAM, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

£

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

LMV LEASING, INC., Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Val CONLIN, Barbara Conlin, Tubber T.
Okuda, Mary Y. Okudst, and Roy W.
Mallory, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 890504-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 16, 1991.
Company which supplied cars to car
rental business for use in business sued
guarantors for amounts owed by car rental
business after default in lease agreements.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Pat B. Brian, J., granted partial summary"
judgment on issue of liability in favor of
company.
Guarantors appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1)
contractual agreement between company
and car rental business was true lease, not
security agreement subject to provisions of
Uniform Commercial Code; (2) under provisions of lease agreement, any failure to
dispose of vehicles in commercially reasonable manner upon default was not absolute
bar to suit for resulting deficiency, and
thus, disputed factual issues relating to
such failure were not relevant to determining liability; (3) although Court of Appeals
had serious reservations about procedure
employed by trial court in deciding damages, error was waived on appeal absent

timely objection in trial court; and (4) party
seeking attorney's fees was not required to
specify hourly rate billed by each attorney
working on case in order to fully comply
with applicable court rule.
Affirmed.
1. Secured Transactions <s=>10
Determination of whether agreement
is lease or secured sales agreement is question of law when analysis is based upon a
language of agreement itself and not upon
extrinsic evidence.
2. Secured Transactions <3=»10
Contractual agreement between rental
car business and company which provided
automobiles was true lease, and not security agreement, and within coverage of Uniform Commercial Code, where there was
no dispositive indication on face of document that parties intended to execute security agreement, and agreement contained
no option to purchase, no provision for
transfer of ownership of vehicles to car
rental business and specifically provided
for retention of title in lessor. U.C.A.1953,
70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102(l)(a).
3. Bailment <s=>20
Secured Transactions <^10
If contract is true lease agreement,
fundamental principles of contract law apply and liability for damages is established
merely by showing breach of agreement's
provisions; if agreement is security agreement subject to Uniform Commercial Code,
commercial reasonableness of disposition
of collateral is prerequisite to bringing deficiency action. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37),
70A-9-102(l)(a), 70A-9-504(3).
4. Secured Transactions <s=>10
In determining nature of agreement
purporting to be true lease, courts must
look behind form of agreement to determine whether it is, in fact, sales agreement
with reservation of security interest in vendor; however, when interpreting court
finds no dispositive evidence that parties
intended agreement to be other than that
what it purports to be by its unambiguous
terms, courts should decline to construe

190
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agreement contrary to those terms. U.C.
A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102(l)(a).
,

5. Secured Transactions <§=240
Under provisions of lease agreement
between car rental company and provider
of automobiles, any failure to dispose of
vehicles in commercially reasonable manner was not absolute bar to suit for resulting deficiency, and thus, disputed factual
issues relating to such failure were not
relevant to determining liability upon default.
6. Appeal and Error <S=>230
Although Court of Appeals had serious
reservations about procedure employed by
trial court in deciding damages in breach of
lease action based solely on affidavits and
memoranda submitted simultaneously by
both parties, error was not adequately preserved for appeal absent timely objection to
procedure at trial and application of any
recognized exceptions to general rule that
failure to object in trial court waives error
on appeal.
7. Costs <3=>198
Party seeking attorney fees was not
required to specify hourly rate billed by
each attorney working on case in order to
comply with applicable court rule, so long
as legal basis of attorney fee award, nature
of work performed by attorneys, number
of hours spent to prosecute claim, and
some affirmation that fees charged were
reasonable in light of comparable legal services were included in party's affidavit in
support of fees. Judicial Administration
Rule 4-505(1).

Val J. Conlin and Barbara Conlin (argued), Henderson, Nev., pro se.
Steven W. Call (argued), Weston L. Harris, Paul A. Hoffman, Watkiss & Saperstein, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
GARFF, JJ.

OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Val and Barbara Conlin appeal from the
trial court's decision finding them liable as
guarantors for amounts owed to LMV
Leasing, Inc. (LMV) by M.C.O., Inc. (MCO).
Because MCO, as principal obligor under
an agreement between it and LMV, defaulted in its obligations, LMV sued the
Conlins and other individual guarantors to
recover amounts owed it under the agreement. The trial court granted LMV's motion for partial summary judgment as to
the liability of the individual guarantors
and ultimately entered final judgment for
LMV. The Conlins appeal both the trial
court's decision to grant LMV's partial
summary judgment motion and its final
judgment. We affirm.
I. FACTS
On December 29, 1986, LMV entered into
a contract with MCO, a Utah corporation
doing business as American International
Rent-A-Car. The contract was entitled
"PREFERRED
VEHICLE
LEASE
AGREEMENT" and anticipated a series of
transactions by which LMV would provide
MCO with automobiles for use in MCO's
car rental business. The agreement named
LMV as lessor and MCO as lessee. According to its provisions, LMV, as lessor,
retained all "right, title or interest" in the
automobiles except for MCO's right to use
the vehicles in accordance with the agreement.
The terms of the agreement did not give
MCO an option to purchase the vehicles
after the termination of the lease agreement, and neither party has alleged the
existence of any oral provision to grant
such an option to MCO. Under the agreement, the lease for each vehicle terminated
either upon default by MCO or at the conclusion of the base lease term. MCO was
obligated to return the vehicles to LMV
after termination. When MCO returned
the vehicles, LMV was to sell the vehicles
at wholesale in a commercially reasonable
manner. After sale of the vehicles, MCO
was entitled to any surplus funds received

LMV LEASING, INC. v. CONLIN
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Cite as 805 P.2d 189 (UtahApp. 1991)
l
from the sale after the book value" of
the cars was deducted from the net selling
price. Similarly, MCO was obligated to
pay LMV for any deficiency resulting after
the book value of the sold vehicle was
subtracted from the net selling price.
The contract established a lease term of
forty-eight months which could be terminated at MCO's discretion subject only to
the requirement of a twelve month minimum lease term. The agreement specified
that MCO could not extend the lease term
for any vehicle beyond the initial fortyeight months and that all tax benefits from
ownership of the vehicles was reserved to
LMV. Rent payments under the lease was
the sum of two factors: the Agreed Price
of the vehicles divided by the forty-eight
month base lease term, and a "financing"
amount 2 The agreement expressly provided that LMV made no warranty regarding
the merchantability, fitness, design, or
quality of the leased vehicles.

MCO had the sole responsibility for the
maintenance and repair of the vehicles, as
well as the obligation to pay title, licensing,
registration and inspection fees. Liability
for property, use, and sales taxes was also
assigned to MCO. Additionally, MCO was
obligated to obtain property and liability
insurance and also agreed to indemnify
.LMV for any claim arising out of or related
to the operation of vehicles rented under
the lease. Finally, the agreement included
detailed provisions setting forth LMV's
remedies in the event of default by MCO,
among which was the option to accelerate
the entire balance of future rent due.
On January 26, 1987, the Conlins signed
an agreement entitled "UNCONDITIONAL AND IRREVOCABLE GUARANTY
OF PAYMENT" by which they agreed per1. "Book value" is defined by the agreement as
"the Agreed Price less the aggregate Monthly
Depreciation." The Agreed Price is defined as
"$100.00 over Dealer Invoice." The Monthly
Depreciation is a constant amount calculated at
the commencement of the lease by which the
Agreed Price is reduced each month. Thus,
book value properly may be described as the
initial cost of the vehicle adjusted monthly by a
constant depreciation factor.
2. Rent payments were actually calculated, however, by adding several factors including the

sonally, unconditionally and irrevocably to
guarantee the payment of any amounts due
LMV from MCO in the event of MCO's
default. In addition to the Conlins, three
other individuals signed identically worded
guaranty agreements.3
MCO filed bankruptcy in August, 1987,
and failed to make monthly payments as
required under the lease agreement after
September, 1987. On January 26, 1988,
LMV's counsel notified the five guarantors
that MCO had incurred an arrearage in its
accounts with LMV. None of the guarantors satisfied the indebtedness or made
payment that could have been applied to
the indebtedness.
On approximately
March 11, 1988, LMV repossessed the vehicles leased to MCO. Anticipating that
the proceeds from the sales of the vehicles
would not be sufficient to satisfy the
amount owed to it under the contract, LMV
filed suit to obtain a deficiency judgment
on April 1, 1988. On April 4, 1988, LMV
notified MCO and the five individual guarantors that LMV would sell the repossessed vehicles commencing April 13, 1988.
The notice of sale explained that the vehicles were to be sold for the highest possible price and that the vehicles were then
and would continue to be located at Nate
Wade Subaru, a Salt Lake City automobile
dealership involved in the retail sale of
used vehicles. The notice declared that the
vehicles would "be sold in the same manner
^nd fashion as other used vehicles located"
at the dealership.
On May 10, 1988, Nate Wade Subaru
commenced selling the fourteen vehicles
that had been repossessed from MCO, with
the last being sold on June 10, 1988. The
vehicles were sold in the same manner emmonthly depreciation value of each car, an administration fee, sales tax, and the financing
charge. The financing charge was derived by
applying an interest rate of two percent over the
prime rate as specified by Citibank, New York,
to the previous month's book value.
3. All five guarantors were initially named as
defendants in LMVs deficiency action. The
other guarantors, however, have settled and do
not appeal.
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ployed by the dealership to sell other used
cars on its lot, namely, by private sale.
After filing its complaint, LMV moved
for summary judgment on both liability
and damages, which motion was denied by
the trial court. The court then granted
LMV's subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Finding no genuine issue as to any material
fact regarding the liability of defendants
Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin, and the other
individual guarantors based on their personal guaranties, the trial court concluded
that "LMV leasing is granted judgment
against [the guarantors] jointly and severally for any and all amounts owed by MCO,
Inc. . . . to LMV, which includes any damages LMV may have suffered in this action, pursuant to the Preferred Vehicle
Lease Agreement entered into between
MCO and LMV on or about December 29,
1986."
When it granted summary judgment as
to liability, the trial court requested that
the parties submit affidavits as to the
amount of damages for which the guarantors were liable to LMV. The guarantors
and LMV then submitted affidavits regarding the amount of damages incurred by
LMV. The guarantors objected to LMV's
affidavit setting forth attorney fees, arguing that the affidavit failed to comply with
Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. The trial court denied the
motion to strike the affidavit and entered
judgment against the Conlins and the other
defendant-guarantors, jointly and severally, in the amount of $50,500, which included
$13,500 in attorney fees.
On appeal, the Conlins claim the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment
because there were disputed factual issues
as to (1) whether the Preferred Vehicle
Lease Agreement was, in fact, a true lease
or was a security agreement subject to the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("UUCC");
(2) whether the sale of the repossessed
collateral was executed in a commercially
reasonable manner as required by the
UUCC; (3) whether the sale of the repossessed vehicles was executed in a commercially reasonable manner as required by

the contract; (4) whether LMV was barred
from seeking recovery because it impaired
the collateral prior to disposal; and (5) the
amount of damages and LMV's failure to
mitigate damages. The Conlins also contend the trial court erred in (a) assessing
the amount of damages by directing the
parties to submit affidavits and memoranda rather than by conducting a trial on the
issue; and (b) awarding attorney fees when
LMV's affidavit failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A trial court may render summary
judgment only if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632,
634 (Utah 1989); Territorial Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). On review of a trial court's grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts presented and
the inferences fairly arising therefrom in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.,
714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). In determining whether the undisputed facts of a
case entitle the movant to judgment as a
matter of law, this court gives no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
636 (Utah 1989); see also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (summary judgment is, by definition, a conclusion
of law that is accorded no deference by
appellate courts); Daniels v. Deseret Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 P.2d 1100 (Utah
CtApp.1989).
Likewise, the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law which
does not require any particular deference
to the trial court's interpretation of the
contract
Village Inn Apartments v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 790
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1990). We similarly view the determination of whether an
agreement is a lease or a secured sales
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agreement as a question of law when our
analysis is based upon the language of the
agreement itself and not upon extrinsic evidence. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d
714, 716 (Utah 1985).

III. LEGAL NATURE OF
AGREEMENT
[2] The Conlins claim that the trial
court erred in failing to characterize the
agreement as a security agreement rather
than a lease. By arguing that the agreement was a security agreement, the Conlins seek to bring the agreement within the
coverage of the UUCC. Specifically, the
Conlins argue that, under the UUCC, LMV
was obligated to dispose of the repossessed
vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner and any failure to do so bars LMV's
deficiency action.
LMV counters this argument by asserting that whether the agreement was a true
lease or a security agreement is irrelevant
because a commercially reasonable disposition of the repossessed vehicles was required under both the UUCC and the terms
of the agreement.
LMV apparently assumes that commercial reasonableness was relevant only at
the damages phase of the dispute and
therefore whether the agreement was properly characterized as a true lease or a
security agreement was irrelevant to the
partial summary judgment. LMV's analysis fails to address the crucial issue in this
case. As is illustrated below, determining
liability for breach of a lease agreement
differs dramatically from determining liability for breach of a security agreement
under the UUCC.
[3] If the contract is a true lease agreement, fundamental principles of contract
law apply to the case, and liability for
damages is established merely by showing
a breach of the agreement's provisions.4
Under the provisions of the agreement,
failure to dispose of the vehicles in a com4. Neither party disputes the fact that MCO defaulted in its obligations to pay monthly "rental
payments" to LMV. If the contract is a true
lease, this undisputed fact would justify the trial

mercially reasonable manner goes only to
the issue of damages. Therefore, if this is
a lease, commercial reasonableness would
be irrelevant to liability, and the trial court
correctly granted LMV's motion for partial
summary judgment.
The Conlins argue, however, that if the
agreement is a security agreement subject
to the UUCC, LMV's deficiency action
would have been barred unless it disposed
of the repossessed vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner. Accordingly, the
Conlins argue that the commercial reasonableness of the disposition of the collateral
was a prerequisite to bringing a deficiency
action, and that if there is a factual dispute
about commercial reasonableness, summary judgment on liability was erroneously
granted.
The Conlins are correct in their assertion
that contracts properly characterized as security agreements are subject to the
UUCC's requirement that collateral be disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3)
(1990) contains the UUCC's requirement
governing the disposal of collateral by a
secured party and provides:
Disposition of the collateral may be by
public or private proceedings and may be
made by way of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit
or in parcels and at any time and place
and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
commercially reasonable.
(Emphasis added).
Generally, a secured party's failure to
dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner precludes that party from
maintaining a deficiency action. Haggis
Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management,
Inc., 745 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1985); Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee,
649 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1982); FMA Fin.
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 80708 (Utah 1979).5 Thus, if the agreement in
court's entry of partial summary judgment on
the liability issue.
5. There is some question as to the continued
validity of the rule that a creditor cannot recov-
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the present case is a security agreement,
the question of commercial reasonableness
would have been relevant to the trial
court's finding of liability for any subsequent deficiency. Therefore, the threshold
question in our analysis of this case is
whether the agreement entered into by the
parties was, in fact, a true lease agreement
or a security sales agreement subject to
the requirements of the UUCC. Because
in granting LMV's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court did not
clearly state its conclusion as to the nature
of the agreement, we must now determine
its true nature.
In this case, the language used by the
parties repeatedly manifested their intent
that the agreement was a lease. The
agreement was entitled "Preferred Vehicle
Lease Agreement." LMV was referred to
as lessor; MCO was denominated lessee.
Payments made under the agreement were
called rent payments. The language of the
agreement, i.e., the form of the agreement,
would therefore support the conclusion
that this was a lease. This is not the end
of our inquiry however, we next look at the
purpose of the agreement, i.e., its function.
[4] In determining the nature of an
agreement purporting to be a true lease,
courts must look behind the form of an
agreement to determine whether it is, in
fact, a sales agreement with a reservation
of a security interest in the vendor. See,
er a deficiency when the creditor has failed to
dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. In Cottam v. Heppner, 111 P.2d
468, (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's determination that the
secured party had disposed of collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner. Accordingly,
the court did not address the question whether
commercially unreasonable disposition would
have barred a deficiency action. Justice Zimmerman suggested, however, that "[t]he consequences of a creditor's failure to comply fully
with the [commercial reasonableness] requirements of section 70A-9-504(3) have not been
definitively settled in Utah." Id. at 474 n. 4.
Noting that there are three divergent lines of
cases addressing the possible effects of a creditor's failure to appropriately dispose of collateral, Justice Zimmerman suggested that Utah
courts have taken each of the three positions
and therefore concluded that "[t]his is a question that remains open in Utah." Id.

e.g., Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d
706, 709 (Utah 1981) (if transaction purports on its face to be lease but is, in fact, a
security agreement, it is subject to the law
of sales). However, when the interpreting
court finds no dispositive evidence that the
parties intended the agreement to be other
than what it purports to be by its unambiguous terms, that court should decline to
construe the agreement contrary to those
terms. As this court has previously observed, "Where questions arise in the interpretation of an agreement, the first source
of inquiry is within the document itself. It
should be looked at in its entirety and in
accordance with its purpose. All of its
parts should be given effect insofar as that
is possible/' Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
The starting point in determining whether an agreement is a true lease or a security agreement disguised as a lease is to
a
Pply the definitional provisions of the
UUCC. The UUCC applies to "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in
personal property." Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-102(l)(a) (1981). The UUCC defined "security interest" at the time of this
agreement as follows:
"Security interest" means an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. ... Unless a lease or consignIn Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536 (Utah Ct.App.1989) this court
affirmed a trial court's determination that the
Sale of a truck which secured a note was commercially reasonable. Id at 542. This court, in
a footnote, explained that because the disposition of the collateral involved in that case was
Commercially reasonable, the court would not
i-each the question whether a failure to dispose
Of collateral in a commercially reasonable manlier would have barred a deficiency judgment.
Id at 539 n. 4. - However, the court referred to
Justice Zimmerman's footnote in Cottam and
Acknowledged that the question might still be
Unresolved. Id
In the present case, because we conclude that
the agreement between LMV and MCO was a
true lease and not a security agreement, it is
likewise not necessary to determine whether a
Secured party's failure to dispose of collateral in
<i commercially reasonable manner absolutely
precludes a deficiency action under the UUCC.
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ment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security
interest"
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for
security, and (b) an agreement that upon
compliance with the terms of the lease
the lessee shall become or has the option
to become the owner of the property for
no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease
one intended for security.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1980)
(emphasis added) (amended 1990).
Under this statute, for a contract to be
characterized as a security agreement under the UUCC, the parties to the agreement must so intend, and that intent is
determined according to the facts of each
case.
The only objective characteristic identified by the above-quoted statute as affecting the determination whether an agreement is a true lease or a security agreement is the inclusion of a provision transferring ownership upon compliance with
the terms of the lease or the inclusion of an
option to purchase for no additional consideration, or for only nominal consideration.
Mere inclusion of an option does not necessarily constitute a security agreement; the
option must be for only nominal consideration or for no additional consideration, in
which case it is presumed to be a security
agreement. The present agreement contains no option to purchase, and neither
party has alleged the existence of parol
evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we
must discern the intent of the parties as
manifested by the remaining terms of the
agreement. G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions
of the parties and, if possible, to glean
those intentions from the contract itself.'').
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros.
Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court enumerated
several relevant factors in determining

whether a contract is a true lease or a
security agreement:
Numerous factors bear on determining
whether the terms of an agreement show
that it was meant to be a lease or a
security agreement
Among others,
those factors are whether (1) the lessor is
a financier, (2) the lessee is required to
insure the goods in favor of the lessor,
(3) the lessee bears the risk of loss or
damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the taxes,
repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agreement establishes default provisions governing acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial non-refundable deposit is required, (7) the goods are to be selected
from a third party by the lessee, (8) the
rental payments were equivalent to the
costs of the goods plus interest, (9) the
lessor lacks facilities to store or retake
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted with a bank, (11) the warranties usually found in leases are omitted, and (12)
the goods or fixtures are impractical to
remove.
Id. at 487 (citing J. White & R. Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 882-83 (2d ed. 1980));
see also Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624
P.2d 706, 710 (Utah 1981) (setting forth
three tests for determining whether an
agreement purporting to be a lease is a
purchase and sale agreement with reservation of a security interest).
We note that, in setting forth this list,
the supreme court, by its own language,
did not purport to assemble an exhaustive
list of factors that may be considered in
characterizing a contract as a lease or as a
security agreement. Nevertheless, this
partial list is a useful point of reference for
our analysis in this case.
Many of the twelve factors set forth in
Colonial Leasing are found in the present
agreement. MCO was required to provide
insurance, and bore the ultimate risk of
loss for any uninsured amount. MCO was
obligated to pay the taxes as well as the
repair and maintenance costs for the leased
vehicles. The agreement included default
provisions regarding acceleration and resale. The rent payments were roughly
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equivalent to the cost of the vehicles plus
interest. LMV lacked facilities for storing
or retaking the automobiles. Finally, the
agreement specifically excluded any of the
warranties typically found in leases, i.e.,
fitness for purpose, merchantability, and
quality.
Despite the presence of these several
factors, other aspects of the agreement
demonstrate the clear intention of the parties that the agreement was nevertheless
intended to be a true lease agreement.
Most notably, there is no provision, either
explicit or implicit, for transfer of ownership of the vehicles to MCO. "The prime
essential distinction between a lease and a
conditional sale is that in a lease the lessee
never ovms the property." Ford v. Rollins
Protective Serv. Co., 171 Ga.App. 882, 322
S.E.2d 62, 64 (1984) (emphasis added). The
agreement specifically provides for retention of title in LMV, the lessor, which is the
"paramount attribute of a lease." Carlson
v. Tandy Computer Leasing, 803 F.2d 391,
395 (8th Cir.1986). Moreover, the agreement includes no alternate provision for
transfer of ownership such as an option to
purchase at nominal or no additional consideration. Nor is there any indication that
the lessee would receive the functional
equivalent of ownership.6

lease agreement. See, e.g., American
Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement
Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that lessors retention of investment tax
credit on purportedly leased property manifested intent of parties to enter true lease
agreement); Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at
487.
Because we conclude that there is no
dispositive indication on the face of the
document that the parties intended to execute a security agreement, we defer to the
language of the unambiguous instrument.
Accord Carlson, 803 F.2d at 395 (intent of
parties expressed by consistent use of
"lease language"); American Standard
Credit, 643 F.2d at 266 (principle of function over form does not authorize the
courts to ignore the terms of an agreement
a/together).
We therefore conclude as a matter of law
that the contractual agreement between
LMV and MCO1 was a true lease. Because
neither party disputes MCO's default in its
monthly rent payment obligations, it follows that the trial court properly granted
LMV's motion for partial summary judgment as to the guarantors liability for
MCO's deficiency.

Additionally, ownership tax benefits under the lease were reserved exclusively to
the lessor, another traditional indication
that the parties intended to enter a true

[5] Because we have concluded that the
agreement was a true lease, we need not

6. We do not imply here that the only circumstance in which an agreement purporting to be
a lease may be construed as a security agreement is when it includes a purchase option at
nominal or no additional consideration. Section 70A-1-201(37) permits a conclusion that an
agreement is intended as a security agreement if
the lessee receives only the functional equivalent of ownership. Among the functional equivalents which could indicate the intent of the
parties to execute a security agreement is when
the lease term period is approximately equal to
the life of the leased goods.
See, e.g., 68 Am.Jur.2d Secured Transactions
§ 120, 963 n. 48 (1973) (noting that ownership
is typically demonstrated by a purchase option
at a nominal price but that "[i]t is possible that
a lease arrangement may also be considered a
secured transaction if the lease is for a term
equal to the life of the equipment at rentals that
would be cumulatively sufficient to pay in full
for the price of the equipment"); see also Centu-

rian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d at 710 ("a lease
agreement is actually a purchase and sale agreement if the 'lease payments' are clearly designed
to establish an ownership interest in the 'lessee* ")•
In the present agreement, the lease term was
forty-eight months and neither party could extend the lease term. Although the lease payments mighl arguably have equalled the full
price of the vehicles after the full lease term, the
lessee could unilaterally terminate the lease at
any time after twelve months. Therefore MCO
was not absolutely obligated to pay the full
purchase pnee of the vehicles, as it would have
been under a security sales agreement. Moreover, neither party has argued that the life of
the automobiles was limited to the forty-eight
month lease term. By the express terms of the
agreement, the lessor, not the lessee, would retain the significant post-termination value of the
vehicles.

IV. COMMERCIAL REASONABILITY
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address the Conlins' second claim that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there remained a disputed
factual issue as to whether LMV disposed
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner as required by the UUCC.
The UUCC does not control this case inasmuch as we have concluded that the agreement was a true lease.
The Conlins also argue that partial summary judgment should not have been
granted because there remained disputed
factual issues regarding whether the vehicles were disposed of in a commercially
reasonable manner as required by the lease
agreement. Section 19 of the agreement
sets forth the procedure to be followed by
the parties upon termination of the lease
agreement for any car: "At the end of the
Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon
the termination of the lease . . . by Lessor,
or upon the exercise by Lessee of its right
to retire any vehicle from service . . . Lessor will sell it at wholesale in a commercially reasonable manner." Relying on this
provision, the Conlins now argue that, even
though the agreement is a true lease,
LMV, as lessor, was obligated to dispose of
the vehicles upon termination of the lease
agreement in a commercially reasonable
manner.
Even assuming that there remained disputed factual questions about LMV's failure to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner, such questions
could not have precluded summary judgment as to liability. Under the provisions
of the lease agreement, any failure to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner was not anticipated to be
an absolute bar to a suit for any resulting
deficiency. Therefore, disputed factual issues relating to such failure were not relevant to determining liability. The motion
for partial summary judgment was limited
in scope to the issue of liability and because neither party disputes that MCO defaulted in its obligation to pay monthly
rental payments, the motion was properly
granted by the trial court.

V. DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES
BY AFFIDAVITS AND
MEMORANDA
[6] The Conlins argue that the trial
court erred in determining damages based
solely on affidavits and memoranda submitted simultaneously by both parties.
The Conlins allege a deprivation of their
right to trial as guaranteed by the due
process clause of the Utah Constitution.
They argue that submission of the damages issue by affidavit and memoranda deprived them of the opportunity to submit
evidence to a trier of fact and to cross-examine LMV's witnesses.
We do not reach the merits of this argument because it was not adequately preserved for appeal by a timely objection
during the trial proceeding. "[I]t is axiomatic that matters not presented to the
trial court may not be raised for the first
time on appeal." Franklin Fin. v. New
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983); see also Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,
46 (Utah Ct.App.1988). This rule applies
even when an appeal involves constitutional
issues. See, e.g., Salt Lake County v.
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct.App.
1989) (there is no reason to exempt constitutional claims from application of the rule
barring appellate review of claims not
raised at trial); see also, State v. Webb, 790
P.2d 65, 75-80 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (limited
exceptions to the general rule include exceptional circumstances, plain error, and
deprivation of liberty interests). We recently reiterated the policy underlying the
rule precluding appellate review absent a
timely objection:
"If something occurs which the party
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him
that he thereafter cannot have a fair
trial, he must make his objection promptly and seek redress by moving for a
mistrial, or by having cautionary instructions given, if that is deemed adequate,
or be held to waive whatever rights may
have existed to do so." Otherwise, "[i]t
would be manifestly unjust to permit a
party to sit silently by, believing that
prejudicial error had been committed"
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and then "if he loses, come forward"
claiming error.
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d
525 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quoting Hill v.
Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 58, 377 P.2d 186,
188 (1962)).
Although we have serious reservations
about the procedure employed by the trial
court in deciding the damages question, we
are unable to find anything in the record
indicating a timely objection by the Conlins'
trial counsel. As appellants, the Conlins
bear the burden of building a trial record
adequate to preserve their arguments on
appeal. See Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at
1045. Furthermore, the Conlins have advanced no argument that any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule are
present here. Consequently, we decline to
reach the merits of the Conlins* argument.
VI. ATTORNEY FEES
[7] The Conlins also assign as error the
trial court's denial of their motion to strike
LMV's affidavit of attorney fees and the
trial court's subsequent entry of judgment
for attorney fees in the amount of $13,500.
The Conlins argue that LMV's affidavit
failed to comply with Rule 4-505(1) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration in
that the affidavit failed to specify the hourly rate charged by the attorneys who
worked on the case. Rule 4-505(1) provides:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must set forth specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature
of the work performed by the attorney,
the number of hours spent to prosecute
the claim to judgment, or the time spent
in pursuing the matter to the stage for
which attorneys' fees are claimed, and
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services, The affidavit
must also separately state hours by persons other than attorneys, for time
spent, work completed and hourly rate
billed.
The Conlins acknowledge the absence in
the rule of the requirement that an affidavit of attorney fees specify the hourly rate
charged by each attorney working on the

case. They rely, however, on two recent
decisions of this court, Talley v. Talley, 739
P.2d 83 (Utah CtApp.1987), and Maughan
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah CtApp.
1989), for the proposition that the reasonableness of fees cannot be established absent specification of the hourly rate
charged by each attorney.
In Talley, this court reversed a trial
court's award of attorney fees in a divorce
case. In determining the reasonableness
of the amount of requested attorney fees,
the court suggested that there must be
some evidence "regarding the necessity of
the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged
for divorce actions in the community." Id.
(quoting Kerr v Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,
1384-85 (Utah 1980)).
In Maughan, this court reiterated the
standard set forth in Talley and affirmed a
trial court's award of attorney fees. We
deferred to the trial court's judgment regarding the number of attorney hours required to bring the case to judgment Id.
There was no discussion, however, regarding the hourly rate of the attorneys.
Nothing in either Talley or Maughan
suggests that the party seeking attorney
fees must specify the hourly rate billed by
each attorney working on the case in order
to fully comply with Rule 4-505(1). So
long as the legal basis of the award, the
nature of the work performed by the attorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim, and some affirmation that
the fees charged are reasonable in light of
comparable legal services are included in
the affidavit submitted by the party requesting the fees, there is no failure to
comply with Rule 4-505(1). While an hourly rate would likely be helpful to the trial
court, we decline to imply a requirement
that the hourly rate for each attorney must
be specified, tt was therefore within the
trial court's discretion to accept LMV's affidavit absent the hourly rates of each attorney involved. The trial court's denial of
appellant's Motion to Strike the affidavit of
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attorney fees submitted by LMV is therefore affirmed.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have examined the Conlins* remaining assignments of error and have found
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we
affirm both the trial court's grant of
LMV's motion for partial summary judgment and its entry of final judgment.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
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This matter is before the Court upon
appellant's motion for certification to the
Utah Supreme Court, filed 26 December
1990. Appellee stipulated to the motion.
Appellant requests that the matter be certified to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Rule 43, Utah R.App.P.
Rule 43(a) provides that the Court of
Appeals may certify matters to the Supreme Court in cases over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. The instant matter is an appeal from
a judgment and conviction of aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-203(2) (1989). The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over appeals involving a conviction of a
first degree felony.1 Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1989). Thus, this court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal and accordingly
lacks jurisdiction to certify the appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The notice of appeal herein should have
designated the Supreme Court, rather than
the Court of Appeals, as the appellate court
having jurisdiction of the appeal. As the
appeal was improperly pursued in this
Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
matter is transferred to the Utah Supreme
Court, pursuant to Rule 44, Utah R.App.P.

Criminal Law <£=1019
'Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction
over appeal from judgment and conviction
of aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, and accordingly lacked jurisdiction to

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

1. However, under § 78-2-4 (1989) the Supreme
Court may transfer non-capital first degree felo-

nies to the Court of Appeals.
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ADDENDUM I I

-11-

k l A f l HO

PFC

291 West 5<tOO South
Swte 0200
Murray. Utah B4107
801/263-2626

f f C. "L«*or", hereby I * I M I to "te*»e«r, tfvi property deec/fced hereen bob** eccord»ng lo Ihe lermt •

1. D E S C R I P T I O N OF L E A S E D P R O P E R T Y :
QUANTITY

C Q U I f U C N T ( M A N U r A C T U f l C * . M Q O C L MO . T Y P E . CTC 1

Sodick Model CNC1W Electrical Discharge Machine
•Including as additional security The Real Estate owned by Dale L. and
Grethe Larson as evidenced by a deed of trust dated the £ T&~ day of
Noveirber 1984, with this lease referred to therein as the underlying
indebtedness pursuant to Utah code annotated 357-1-31 (as amended).

(1)

l^ik

initial

4845 South 3600 West
Utah
ZIP.

E Q U I P M E N T W I L L BE L O C A T E D A T : S T R E E T A O O R E S S .

Kearns

CITY

INIENOEO USE

£&_
TNltlAU

InftleT >•

84118

S j l t r^ke"

Personal, Family or Household

Business,

I have read and agree unconditionally with paragraph 24 on the reverse side hereof which ttatet that any controversy o'
claim arising out of this contract shall be settled by A R B I T R A T I O N in Salt Lake CitY. Utah, and judgment upon ilv!
award rendered may b« entered in the courts of the State of Utah; and I hereby agree to submit to arbitration J* the
jurisdiction tor purposes, o( enforcement o< this agreement, a n d a g r e e t o p e r m i t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f
Title

2. PAYMENT ANO LEASE TERM: 57 of Utah Cede Amotated relating to trust deed forclosures to /pmam
in f u l l force & effect separate and apart from this provision./^ //<
60

Ouretion of Lease;
Due on

2 7t h

..months

day ol tJch

El month

Qquarter

OOther

Security Deposit Refundable at maturity

J

Payment amount each period

J

—L.

J

11—27

i

Neat payment due

1 2-2 7

1

^t§7.

Total Payment including Use Tax

S—2.L 19&

' ^Z.

1Q

Total F R O N T P A Y M E N T including Security Denosit

t

Use Ta*
#

" '94.30

1Q ft &

At 0 * office* o/ P F C In Sal Lake Cry.
Piyn^ntth+ynmnq

.............

fl4

4/217.94

3. A S S I G N M E N T O F W A R R A N T I E S A N O L I M I T O N LESSOR'S L I A B I L I T Y : Neither Ltitor nor any assignee of Lessor shall b« habit (or 4.iy lj.iu*e to
perform any provition hereof resulting from fire or other casualty, not, Strike o« other It bo/ difficulty, governmental regulation or restriction or any caute b«yond Lessor's control. In no event shall Lessor be liable for any loss of profits or other consequential damage or any inconvenience resulting from any i h e ' t ,
damage to. I o n of, delect in or failure of the equipment, or the time consumed in recovering, repairing, adiustmg, servicing or replacing me tame and there Hull
be no abatement or apportionment of rental during such time. LESSOR M A K E S NO W A R R A N T Y . EXPRESS OR I M P L I E O . C O N C E R N I N G THE EQUIP
M E N T H O W E V E R . THIS OOES N O T A B R O G A T E A N Y W A R R A N T Y P R O V I O E D 8 Y THE M A N U F A C T U R E R , W H I C H W A R R A N T I E S AME HEREBY
A S S I G N E D T O LESSEE TO T H E E X T E N T P E R M I T T E D BY C O N T R A C T A N D LAW.

>

4. I N S U R A N C E : Lessee, i t its sole cost end expense, shall maintain In full force on all such equipment during the term of this Agreement
(a) A policy of publl: liability and property damage Insurance protecting t h t Inttrtst of Lessor and Lessee with respect to their liability lor iniunei to irmd
persons and damage lo and lott of use of property of third persons resulting Irom the operation of tht equipment leased hereunder Such public lability and
property damage insurance shall have limits of not less than J 100.000 per pe*ten and $300 0 0 0 for all persons injured or killed in the lame accident and thjil
also have a limit of not lets than $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 for damage, destruction and loss of use of property of third persons as a result of any one accident unlets o«»«e« v»»te here
Stated.
(bl A policy of harard insurance Including fire, theft or damage from all other insurable sources on said equipment the deductible amount to be not in
eecesi of S3 SO Lessee shall stand tht eapanse of said deductiblt amount. The hazard insurance on such equipment shall be for the actual cash value ol the equipment, and m such amounts at the Lessor shell deem adequate.
P A R T I E S H A V E R E A O T H E A B O V E P R O V I S I O N S A N O A L S O P A R A G R A P H S 4 T H R O U G H 24 O N THE R E V E R S E S I 0 E H E R E O F A N O AGREE
T O BE 0 O U N O BY A L L SUCH P R O V I S I O N S .
I N WITNESS W H E R E O F , the parties hereto have executed this instrument on the date below listed.
Contact:
f

Kent Kncwle

^

972-5774

S U P P L I E R O F E Q U I P M E N T ( C O M P U X T K AOOft««c|

BTTEPMOJirrAIN MACHINE TOOL
1090 Pioneer Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 '
( I N C L U O f ZIP C O O f }

1

„
I

969-7064

Bob Lucking

F U L L L E G A L N A M E ANO ADORESS OF LE5SEE

Robert J, Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire
PO Box 168
IXM
West Jordon, Utah 84084
L

I I N C L U D 6 ZIP C O O t )

LESSEE(S)

(Sign Below)

OATE EXECUTED BY LESSEE November

Acctptid

by

84

27,

f^-sg^2.
_ L7 ^
_iee
LW

m

^__

^

(If Corporation President. Vice President or Tteeturer should

LPASF — 'nuiriuii

I

^

I t Ati shall luiiush lo I essot I copy ol such a?
"»policies pnue la taking delivery ot Equipment lessoi slu.
* ^ddilion^l named msweil mi Mi ien.uncil police* M
any iim< I two* does not na«e evidence ol such cui
nsutant* IBSSIM may Heal such liiluic as a default UIWIM
ontiaci In (he evmt of inr cam ril u.on ul JUT ol me
MttMancepaiiriet r e n t e d ftetei* lessee shall give I i , k « t m r n n d J K I M ) K ( el such canceilaiiii* and me uie by ln>w ul I ni«pm«"t •>haitce.ur ^mlany i»nM o« i>nmns m
• » H « i i ut implied given i t lessee hereunder lo use and upeialc sa»d equipment shall cease uiwMail sutn Misuume h is brent e»«»*d o# icuMced In Hir e. nil Suvh uitmani e is
not iene wed oi icplaced Equipment shall be mmned lo I essot and Iessot shall have (he tight lo icpasscss Ihe same wiitimit h jhility lot u espasv oi iesnonsibiM» * •"' > rso«-i 110
dot lu any aitiOelcliinuf attached lo it and I essee spenticoily agrees (aittui his signaim e upon ires document cuiisliimes ins knuwmgw HW«I olii.sng i t i o i r m m e t r s w i u
g(» e him not* c and a hear mo, pr tot to repossession and (b)thal should lessor Keel loputchaselheiequiiediiisiii.JiM-eoitnH all u H e s v f I e%sre «.«<« uimnrtfmjmJ
ifmhnir
lessen (oi the cost ol such insurance t essee aqrees lo indemnity and lo save I t s tot haimltss It oni and aqainsl any and ail tn#s damaqes cUms Lauililies ami eipm r .n jny
manner ammo, out ol Ihe claims m»uiy oe damages lo peiscns ot ptopeily as a i-suM ol lessees operation ul tqutumenl
AH msiM J4>ce shall be m twee mil only duimq the leim ol lhts lease Nil MI addition thereto liom Ihe lune ol delivery ul cm ipmeni lol essee ami unid ti|inpinnn is • < tinnr I to
lessoi shail piovidc lot a 10 day pnot written notice lo lessoi ol cancellaiiun ot leritrflMMi in covet age ami sh iiluiuieil the mieieiiot bom I I-SSOI ami l essee m I u«i.,intr.ii «••
as ihe case may he shall ptoicct bnih I essot and lessee with respect lo nsk ansing out ol Ihe condition mainiritance ute ot operad/m n< equipment Hie u".« e r h ui j » r
wsut ance received by 1essoi on account ol ot (oi any loss ot casually winch has been made good by I essee shall I K ielrased lo I essec upon sadsl ailui y \» ool that S J d toss oi
casually has been made good unless the lesstt is al the Imtt in default ol Ihe payment ol any other liability hetcundet
5 SUf flllR NOT i n AC(Mf lessee understands and agrees lhat neiiheMuppiici no* any salesman or oihet agemiolsupcliei is an agent ol lessor No salesman <a agent ol
suppler is authorized lo waive or ailci any l u m or condition ol (his lease andno tcpiestnialtOQ aslo Equipment w any oihei mallet by supplier snail tn any way alltcl leasee s
duly lo pay the icnl and pcilotm ris oiner obligations at sei lotth m INs lease .
ft OftOf ftllfi tQUlFMf it f I essot agrees lo order Equipment from Supplier upon Ihe lermi and conditions ol Ihe purchase ordi r initially attached hei eio lesser agrees lo an ange
loi actively ol Equipment so that il can be accepted witlunnNiely days alter the dale ol this lease Anyot attexcepiiunsio l u l l and lOMPU t l delivery ul the emu tscheiKj'eol
equipment as above shown is below slated by lessee in space provided It space is loll "Wank"by lcs,ui it it luily understood and agieedihai lessee heieby accepts lull and
complete lesponsibitily lot Equipment scheduled and heieby stipulate* Hut Delivery and Accapianci is willioul exception complete

7 S U M M I T StCUHITT MO SCGUftlTTflCFfllIT. Trie guaranty SKut ily and ttcuniy deposit if any guarantees (fie fuN petloimanca of the tease and sfta'l be relumed to lessee
upon the normal cepuadon of this lease The primary purpose ot Ihe guaranty and security deposit is to protect lessor «i the f*tnt of a default guarantee the letum ol me
equipment HI good condition reasonable weat and (ear excepted and provide security lot Ihe payment ol costs of repairs repossession and/or delaull eipense s an J penalties H
any security deposit remains alter Hie payment oi Ihe costs oi < el urn of equipment, me tepati oi Ihe same and other delaull expenses and penalties men I essoi may iypty i'»»
ticess lo unpaid lease payments and DAMAGES.
I X t f l t M USI.alllRAtlORS lessee at its eipensi shall keep Equipment MI good working condition and repair and furnish all taoor parts mecnanumt ana devices «eau.r«d
thceiot lessee shall use fquipment m a carelui and lawful manner lessee shaft not make any alterations additions or improvements 10 equipment *iinoui lessui s P"o<
written consent AH conditions and improvements made to Equipment thai belong lo lessor and shall nol be icmoved without lessor s prior wniien konsem
9 OW«(«SMlf» FOIIQMU MOff ITT fqmpmentrt and shall at aH times remain the properly o i l essoi and lest re shall have no ughl title OMnie»esiiheieinoiineftioe«ceoi
as n pies sly set foilh m this lease Equipment t* and shall al all limes be and remain personal ptopeily notwithstanding inal Iquipment oi any pait iheieoi may no« be or
her caller become tn any mtnntt alfucd ot attached lo real ptopeily oi any building thereon
10 m u n i t i o n Of U1S< M 8 K U U M OF f W f t I T T Subiect to Option lo Purchase (see paragraph I I ) al the O P * an on ol INs lease ot upon demand by lessoi made put suam
lo Ihe default provisions heieol lessee alitscipcnsc ShallrctuinEquipmentingoodwotkingcsnrVilionandrepair py deliveung it packed and teady (or shipmem losuchpiace
ot on ooaid such canter as lessor may specify If purchase by lessee ot return ol Equipment is nol elleclcd wiirvn 30days oi maturity ol this lease lessee agicts to cuuimuc
normal monthly rent payments lo lessor until Equipment is etiner purcnased ot returned to lessor
I I OHrflM TO PURCHASE lessee shall have an option lo purchase Equipment at the end ol Ihe lease period lot f AIR MAHhE I VAiuE al thai lime plus all obligation* < tmaim»g
due undei this lease Notice ol eiercisc ol this option must be given MI writing lo lessor ot I essot s assignee ail Musi Ihn ty t30» days prior toiheeipiialionui the (rase litis
option shall termMiate and be avoid upon letnvnation ol this lease by reason of lessees deiautl
1? XlCMf TO f tOTECT {QUff MCKf II lessee tails to maintain insurance pay l a m Assessments costs and an> e»pense vihich I essee is heieundenequnedio pay lessor may
make eip<ndttures tot Such purposes and Ihe amounts SO expended srvalt become tcnmediaiely due and pay-ijle by lessee to lessor lessor snait have ih< ng'd io mspeii
Equiomeia at any teasonabtc lune ot placi
13 0(ftUlT I T U J I H In iht event lessee Mes or there is earned lobe Med a petition in bankruptcy or shallmakeorhavemade an assignment lor ihebet»eiitofcitdiiois o> J
a receiver shall be appointed lor (essec or il lessee shall have permitted ot sullcied any attachment levy execution I O L I made levied or entered against or <n any iesfiM on
any ot all oi lessee s propeity ot lails lo pertorm any oiher oWnialiOfl oi INs I case (except payment ol rent ot in^inienani.t ul insurance which are dead wan ncieuii then upon
lrv« (Si days written notice by lessor to lessee, lo coneci me deiaufl ihe tight ol lessee under INs lease shafl iheretipon expne
Many event mat lessee fads to make any payment duo and owmg hereunder for a period of fifteen (1$i days after such payment is dui then the ngnts o i l essee undei m«s
Agreement shall thereupon expire. Any extension ol iimt or other alteration «i contract lerms allowed by lessor shall not deprive it oi any ot its ngnts ncieunoei
14 QAMACE! tn the event that lessee lads lo pcrloem m accordance wtdi the terms and conditions ol this leas t and the i ights ol t essee hei eundei eipue me lessee jg< tes io
pay to Irssot any and att amounts Of unpaid monthly payments computed to ihe date of return of such piopctty together with any loss or damage which lessor may sutler as a
result of (he breach of lhts lease by Lessee if being mutually agreed between (essoe and Ihe lessee that the immmuin 1 mount oi such ioss as a result ol any smh Breach as
liquidated damages dui »nd payable on the dale of expiration oi this I ease shaft be J sum equal to one trued) oi ine monthly payments mat wouiJ nave bttn paid it me I ease had
continued m full force and effect Iqi Ihe pcrwd tel forth tn Paragraph 2 above wtinoul consideration oi ihe *hoiienin<) oi Ihe leim by reason ol delaull
Die lailutc ol lessoi at any time lo exercise its tights under this paragraph MI me event ol any such delaull by I esseeshallnot ailrct us tight and powet to neicise su< n ngms
in the event ol any subsequent default for the purpose ol t eposse ssmg Equipment lessor may etilcr upun any ptemises oi H essee wheic Equipment may be and remove the same
and lessee hereby waives any claim (or trespass Of damage occasioned thereby
lessee shall bear the entire risk, ot loss theft, desliuctton or damage of Equipment ot any item Ihoieol (herein loss or Damage I liom any cause whatsoever No loss or
damage or malfunction ol Equipment shall relieve lessee oi ihe oofigalioti to pay rent ot any other obligation under INs lease tn the event ol toss ot damage lessee al me opdon
ol lessor shall la) place ihe same in good condition and repair or ibl replace the same with like equipment m gnod condition and repau with deai title met em to (essu* or u t pay
to lessor the total ol the following amounts dl the total rent due and owing at the time ol Such payment plus (m the p eseni value (at the Sail I ate Ciiy cunent tun* u i t ol
mterestl ol all rent and other amounts payable by lessee with respect to said item from date ol such payment lo date ul e ipir anon ol Ihe then current term ol this lease plus '"•>
the tesiduai vajua which said item would have had al tne end oi the term Upon lessor s receipt oi such payment lessrt and/or lessee s insurer shall he emitted to lessoi s
interest in said Hem (or salvage purposes, in m Inen condition and location as is. without warranty express or implied
15 I f U Q I S E l f d S t S I essee shall pay lessor alt costs and cipenses including late payment assessments reasonable attorney s f e s the fersolrollet tion agencies ->'•«• -»"
other cipenses oi collection such as telephone and telegraph charges Mxuncd by lessoi MI cniuicing any ol lite lerms COIMIIIHIIIS OI provisions heieol
16 IQI CIS Any not«e requited to be given hereunder shall be deemed completed live (Si days altet posting with potljqe pi epaid MI tegutai ot ceiiiliedU S maiiiue^huliiie
patties al their respective addresses indicated m the initial paragraph oi this least
17 A ME HOME I IS. Any amendment to this lease must be m*dt HI writing signed and daied by the patties and attuned lo lhts least
11 1ICN1S TO ASSJM IEASE.
l a i l essee agi ees that 1 essot may assign att or any pan of the monies and claims (or monies due and to bet ome due to I essot and all other rights oi I e<sor under mis lease
Ugmi rer npt of written notice of assignment leasee shall pay lo assignee alt moncs as ihey become due tinder this I cas t lessee s obligation to QI\ said monies io ine ass*)i«t
snjtl oe unconditional and shall not be subject lo any defense or oflsel unless ot unlit assignee notifies tessr-e in writing inal Ims I ease has been reassigned bat k tole^or
(hllessec agrees Ihain will nol assign transfer sublet ot lease its r*jhis under INs I ease and will nol pledge inongacic or otherwise encumber ot suoiettiu ot pcimiitnciisi
upon or be subjected to any lien o* chaige any tight ot Miteiesl ot lessee hereunder without lessor s pi KM wniien consent
l» lOCATldaj lESSflfX IMS'ICTIOH. IAIEIS Equipment shall be delivered and thereafter kept at the location :p«ili<d above or if none is specified at lessees addiessset
lorth above and shall not be removed Iherelioin without lessor s prior written consent lessor shall hi^t Ihe right lo inspect Equipment at any ic asonable time H lessoi
supplies lessee wun labels slating thai Equipment is owned by lessor lessee shatt alln and keep same m a prominent place on each iiem oi Equipment
?0 TfUktHAnonau/tlUCTErlkt THIS IEASE MAY HO! 81 fERMINAfEDPWOli I Q l l S E X f l J U l W N U Y l l f H I R F A H i r i (CCIM lltAI USSOflMAr rtllMlNAlt lltl ACIMEMINl
UrOK OlfAUir aY I t S S H AS SrAIEU HEHElnl
21 IATE CMAICE It I essee fatts lo pay when due rent ot other amount requwed herein lo be p»d by I esser t essre sh.iN pay lo I essoi a laic chaiqe ol live peicmt iS t ol r J< n
mslailment or part theieol lot which said tent or other amount shall be delinquent ot Si 00 whichever is greater plus Mite i est on such delinquent rent oi other amount liom tr* due
dale thereof until paid at me rate of I f . per annual both before and altet any judgment that may be icmleied ** l.ivor ol lessoi against lessee on said sums
22 l i t * ! T l l l l lesset shaft keep Equipment fret and clear of art levies hens and encumbrances lessee shall MI the manner dwected by lessoi |a| make and lite J(>
dectiialiens and returns m connection with all charges and taies (local stale and loderai) which may now or heiealtet he imposed upon ni mcasuicd uy the ownet sh<p leasing
rental sale puicrtase possession or use ol Equipment excluding, huwevee att taies on tr measured by lessut s net income and |h| p^y all such chaiqcs and taies
K lessee lads lo discharge said levies kens and encumbrances ot lo pay said charges and laics lessor shall have the right but shaft nol be obligated io tiled sucn
discharge or pay such charges and taxes In that event lesset shal icpay ha lessor tne cost I heieol with the ncit payment ol tent
23 TA1IEIEUTS if iNVESTMENriAXCAEDIE is passed Itomlassotlo lessee if must be by written consent of I essot and ui that event if I essot rs caused by I essee s default
M oiiiu action of lessee at variance with tins assignment or by government action to saennca Investment la« 0edits depreciation or ihe loss ol any uirwi \n Ur.iHitN m
wiwch | i \ t o i it omjinaity emitted I essee egrets to mdemmly I essoi aga*ntl itieu lasses Tms wilt be (he ditlireiKC between l essot s laa liability betui e io»t oi u< beixl>u J»d
Ihe ti4lMkiy datciimnee lo e«i>i altet lessoi s lots ot tax binelits
21 1 I I I I J U T W I ANY COHIROVERSY Ofl a A t M AftlSJNG OUf Of OH HCUIING TO THIS r.OKfAAC? OR TltT RftEAOl fHEREOf SHAll BE SEUlEO Ht AH8HRAI10N IN
ACCOMANCE WlfH HIE nw ESOf DIE AMJRJCANARDIfrUIlONASSOCMIIOM ANOJUOCUENI UWN lift AWAfllllll HIM Rf OBV lift AnminAinHiSlMAYHI m i l tel OlM*»er
COURl HAVING JUHlSOtCllONlMIRtOf ARBIIRAJK3N SHAII 81 HEI OIN lltC a i Y O f S A I I I A M COUNIYOf SAll IAXE b l A l l Of UIAH ANOANYUUESIIONUI I AvVbltAt I
81 OICIOCOIMACCOHOANCE WllH ! HE LAWS Of i H t SI A IE Of UIAH
n EIltRI A C I U l t H J fhrs least is inlendcd by Ihe patties as the fmal exp<ess>o* of Iheu iqtttmerH i«4 as a complete and cictusivc statement ol theieims iheieol H>c
parties shall nol be bound by any agents tr employees representation promise et inducement not set lotlli MI this a x e m e n ! No rcu<escniai»ons undcisuiionuj) oi
agieements have been made ot ictied upon MI (IMJ manmg el tins agtecmcnf other man those spcciutally set luttn heiem
26 IfSJfE BOCUMltTlIIOi lessee shall provide lessor with such corporate resolutions oomom of counset Uv mciaf sfarrments and other documents as lessor sn^n
request bOMi time to time U mote ihm one lessee a named MI INs least. iheliaMttyel eacii shall be tomt and several II lessor so icquests lessee siiaiie»ecuiesuc»doiuine«i%
as lessot siutt reauwe lot tilmg or tecordrnf. .

